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We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff-distorted, 
open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public 
sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from 
such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are 
welfare improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly 
fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization 
politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary 
reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization. 
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1.  Introduction 
Discouraged by the poor performance of public sector enterprises (PSEs), 
governments in several developing market economies—e.g., India, Chile, Egypt, 
Mexico, Philippines, Turkey—have attempted to withdraw from the production of 
“private” goods.
1 Does the withdrawal of government from production—which we 
refer to as privatization in the remainder of the paper—improve welfare?  We address 
this question in a simple two-factor, two-sector, general equilibrium, open economy 
framework where the sector comprising of public enterprises and private firms is 
imperfectly competitive.
2 
  We find that privatization, if pursued alone, can often reduce the welfare of 
the workers. This might make privatization politically infeasible in democratic 
developing economies since workers often constitute a majority or the support base of 
the ruling party. Privatization can, however, be politically feasible (i.e., welfare-
improving for workers) with complementary reforms. For example, an increase in 
foreign investment in conjunction with privatization improves the workers’ welfare. 
Trade liberalization, pursued along with privatization, can improve workers’ welfare 
under certain conditions.
3  
Our analysis, a brief sketch of which is given in section 1.1, contributes to the 
ongoing debate on privatization in developing countries in at least three important 
ways, which we discuss below. Specific contributions are discussed in section 1.2. 
First, although the existing literature on privatization based on a partial 
equilibrium framework (see section 1.2 below for a review of this literature) offers 
some insights into the debate, the effect of privatization on workers’ wages, and more 
generally on factor returns—which lie at the heart of the privatization debate—is 
missing. By explicitly incorporating factor markets for labor and capital into our 
general equilibrium open economy framework, we offer a richer analysis and show 
                                                 
1 Various explanations have been offered for the lackluster performance of public enterprises, e.g., a 
distorted incentive structure, the plurality of principals and objectives which often results in 
inefficient utilization of resources, over-employment, and low productivity. There is a vast body of 
empirical literature confirming the inefficiency of public enterprises in developed as well as 
developing countries. See, e.g.,Galal et al. (1994) and Majumdar (1998). For a survey of the 
empirical findings, see Megginson and Netter (2001).  
2 The presence of imperfect competition together with increasing returns to scale provides a meaningful 
role of firms. The imperfectly competitive structure is a good description of markets in the less 
developed countries (see Nellis and Kikeri, 1989, p. 663). 
3 It is important to note that in an imperfectly competitive model such as ours, trade liberalization alone 
does not necessarily improve welfare. Nor, for that matter, does capital inflow.    2
that indeed, privatization can reduce wages, which in turn can lower welfare.  
Second, most studies on privatization referred to in section 1.2 consider a 
short-run set up with a fixed number of firms. Hence, they are not well suited to 
addressing another important concern—the effect of privatization on the domestic 
market structure. By explicitly incorporating entry–exit considerations into our 
framework we address this concern and find that a reduction in public sector 
production does not necessarily encourage the entry of private producers. In other 
words, private producers, rather than entering to fill the void created by the 
contraction of PSEs, might exit, which can reinforce (partial) deindustrialization.   
Third, focusing on a tariff-distorted open economy (instead of a closed 
economy) allows us to examine the effect of a combination of policies—e.g., 
privatization and foreign investment, privatization and trade liberalization—which 
typically comes with a reform package. Apart from generating a rich set of 
possibilities, the open economy description is also more realistic. Over the last two 
decades, developing countries embarking on privatization were also usually the ones 
lowering their tariffs (see Sachs and Warner, 1995).
4 By analyzing trade 
liberalization, privatization, and capital inflows in a unified general equilibrium 
framework, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the complementarities 
(or the lack thereof) between these policies.  
1.1  A Preview of the Model and Results 
Adapting a monopolistic competitive model along the lines of Venables (1982) 
and Helpman and Krugman (1985), we focus on a small tariff-ridden open economy. 
It produces (and consumes) a homogenous good and a number of differentiated 
brands, and imports a range of foreign brands. The homogenous good, produced 
under constant returns to scale, is exported whereas the differentiated domestic 
brands, exhibiting increasing returns, are non-traded and are produced by private and 
public sector firms.  
A key difference between a public sector enterprise and a private firm is in the 
                                                 
4 Sachs and Warner (1995) label a country as closed or open based on a combination of criteria (e.g., 
tariff rate, exports to GDP ratio, black market premium etc.). They also provide timings for 
liberalization, i.e., when the countries switched from being closed to open. Their classification shows 
that among the countries (mentioned earlier in the Introduction) which embarked on privatization, 
Chile opened up in 1970s, Mexico, Philippines and Turkey in late 1980s. India qualified as open in 
the mid-1990s. Egypt was the only one never considered as open.    3
objective function. Private firms maximize profit. On the other hand, public firms 
typically have non-profit motives.  Due to political influence, PSEs often employ 
inefficiently high amount of labor. As Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) write: 
“while excess employment is not the only politically demanded inefficiency of state 
firms it is surely the most commonly noted one.”  They construct a politician’s 
objective function which reflects that the politician prefers higher labor spending in 
the PSEs.  In a similar spirit, to capture the non-pecuniary benefit from higher 
employment in public firms, we assume that a public firm maximizes its own profit 
plus a fraction of wage bill paid to its workers. Effectively, this implies that a public 
firm receives a wage subsidy. The presence of implicit wage subsidy leads to a lower 
capital-labor ratio in PSEs compared to their private counterparts.  
We model privatization as a reduction of the fractional weight on wage bill.  
This acts as a reduction of wage subsidy to public firm. For a wide range of 
parameterizations, the reduction in subsidy leads to a contraction of the PSE. Due to 
its use of labor-intensive techniques, this contraction in turn gives rise to an excess 
supply of labor, which in our full employment model lowers wages. Indeed, the 
situation can be even worse. In equilibrium, if the PSEs use the most labor-intensive 
technique while the private brands producers use the least labor-intensive one then the 
production of private differentiated goods might decrease. Domestic private producers 
might exit from the differentiated goods sector and thus privatization may fail to 
encourage the entry of more private producers—something it was implicitly expected 
to do. The reduction in the number of available varieties (i.e., fewer private brands), 
combined with lower wages implies that unless accompanied by other policies, the 
privatization program will generally reduce the welfare of workers.   
The immiserization of workers poses a problem in terms of political viability of 
the privatization program since in a large number of democratic developing countries, 
workers constitute the majority and/or the support base of the ruling parties. So, even 
if privatization is welfare improving in overall terms (which may not be the case), it 
might not be politically viable in the absence of complementary reforms.
5 Are there 
complementary reforms which can be pursued in conjunction with privatization to 
prevent a reduction in workers’ welfare?  
                                                 
5 For discussions on the importance of political viability in privatization programs, see World Bank 
(1995).  Also see Clarke and Cull (2005) in this regard.   4
Given that ours is an open economy model, two policy choices seem natural—
lowering of trade restrictions and/or encouraging foreign investment. Increased capital 
inflows lead to an increase in the number of brands (via the entry of private 
producers) as well as an increase in wages, which in turn improves welfare. Although 
trade liberalization, by expanding the relatively labor-intensive homogenous goods 
sector, increases wages, it comes at the expense of reduced variety. Thus trade 
liberalization, if pursued along with privatization, improves welfare only if the effect 
of a decline in variety on welfare is not too strong.     
1.2  Related Literature   
Our paper is manifestly related to the trade literature on imperfect competition 
in general, and on monopolistic competition in particular. Though some particular 
aspects of the model—e.g., optimal tariffs (see Venables, 1982) and the welfare 
effects of capital inflows—have been analyzed (see, e.g., Sen et al., 1997; 
Chakraborty, 2001), the introduction of government production in a tractable fashion 
is novel. More importantly, incorporating government production allows us to 
conduct a simultaneous investigation of three important issues—privatization, trade 
liberalization, and foreign investment—which are often mentioned in the same breath 
in the financial press but rarely analyzed in a rigorous unified framework.    
The public economics literature on mixed oligopoly, which typically uses a 
partial equilibrium set up, asks the same question as we do—namely, when does 
privatization improve welfare?
6 This literature offers several reasons why 
privatization might improve welfare. DeFraja and Delbono (1989) show that in the 
presence of increasing marginal costs (i.e., decreasing returns to scale), privatization, 
by reducing the scale of production of former PSEs, improves production efficiency, 
which can improve welfare. Using a spatial model of product differentiation, Cremer 
                                                 
6 Apart from the mixed oligopoly literature, there are at least three distinct strands of literature on 
privatization. See Roland (2000) for a comprehensive analysis of privatization in transition 
economies. Despite providing insights that are generally applicable, the absence of markets in the 
pre-transition period makes it difficult to compare the findings across periods, and hence we refrain 
from discussing this literature. We also abstract from the incomplete contract-based literature (see 
Hart et al., 1997; Schmidt 1996) of privatization, which focuses on the incentives arising from 
ownership (private versus public). This brings a new angle to the privatization debate (i.e., 
ownership), which has traditionally focused on market competition. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
this is probably more appropriate in the context of privatization of public provision in developed 
countries (e.g., schools, hospitals, prisons etc.). Finally, there is a third strand of literature based on a 
principal–agent model which focuses on managerial incentives and monitoring problems. See, e.g., 
Barros (1994), De Fraja (1993).        5
et al. (1991) show that the presence of a public firm could result in product 
configuration which is too concentrated. Privatization, by reducing concentration, can 
improve welfare. Building on a Hotelling-duopoly framework and introducing 
endogenous cost differentials between public and private enterprises, Matsumura and 
Matsushima (2004) show that the private firms are indeed more efficient than the 
public ones. However, the increased efficiency comes at the expense of excessive 
investment in cost-reducing activities. Privatization in their framework improves 
welfare by mitigating the loss arising from excessive cost-reducing investments.  
Anderson et al. (1997) provide an important potential benefit of privatization, 
which only manifests itself in the long run (i.e., with free entry). In the short run, with 
a fixed number of firms, the presence of a public sector firm lowers prices, which 
increases welfare. However, in the long run, the lower prices of public firms act as 
entry deterrent and, consequently, fewer varieties are offered in the market. Anderson 
et al. show that privatization, by increasing the number of varieties, can lead to higher 
welfare provided the public firm was incurring losses (before privatization).
7 Free 
entry of private producers has also been discussed in the context of partial 
privatization in Matsumura and Kanda (2005) and Fujiwara (2007).  Both these works 
show that in the presence of free entry, the results with a fixed number of private 
firms might no longer hold. 
Entry considerations play an important role in our framework as well. But 
because of the absence of factor markets, the framework used in the abovementioned 
papers cannot be used to explore some of the key issues and concerns—e.g., fall in 
wages and/or a rise in unemployment, deindustrialization, conflicts across factor 
owners—associated with the privatization programs, especially in developing 
countries. Our two-factor, two-sector, general equilibrium framework, to which we 
turn now, exploits an important channel through which the contraction of the public 
sector works—the economy-wide reallocation of resources and subsequent effects on 
factor returns, entry, and production.  
As far as we are aware, Beladi and Chao (2006) is the only paper that considers 
labor market issues in the context of privatization. In a dual economy (but a closed 
one), they show that an increase in private ownership leads to an increase in urban 
                                                 
7 The papers on mixed oligopoly discussed here are mainly theoretical in nature. For empirical analysis 
on mixed oligopoly, see Barros and Modesto (1999). They investigate the regulatory role of public 
firm in the Portuguese banking sector, which consists of private as well as public firms.    6
employment in the short run. In the long run, the unemployment problem becomes 
less severe as capital moves to the rural sector. Unlike their framework, ours is a full 
employment general equilibrium setting. The key difference, however, is that ours is 
an open economy set up in contrast to the closed economy setting considered in 
Beladi and Chao (2006). Considering an open economy allows us to examine the role 
of complementary reforms—trade liberalization and freer capital inflows—in 
generating political support for privatization.    
   
2  The Model 
Consider a small tariff-ridden open economy comprising of L  workers and d K  
capitalists. Each worker has one unit of labor while each capitalist has one unit of 
capital.
8 The workers and the capitalists have identical preferences.  
2.1  Consumers 
Each individual i maximizes an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas utility function given 
by 
                   
α α − =
1
i i i y X U ,       ( 1 )  
subject to the budget constraint  
       i i i z PX y = + ,          (2) 
where, yi, Xi, and zi denote, respectively, the amount of individual i’s (i) consumption 
of the (numeraire) homogenous good y, (ii) consumption of an aggregate quantity 
index of differentiated goods X  (whose price is P ), and (iii) income. Apart from 
factor earnings, zi includes a share of tariff revenues (which is rebated to individual i) 
and is net of lump-sum taxes that are used to cover losses (if any) of the PSEs. 
The quantity index (or alternatively the sub-utility function of the Dixit-
Stiglitz type) i X , defined below, captures consumers’ love for variety:    
































ki i ,       (3) 
where xki, 
*
ji x , and s denote, respectively, the amount of individual i’s consumption of 
                                                 
8 The assumption that each capitalist owns one unit of capital captures the fact that each capitalist is 
small. However, this assumption is only for simplification and nothing substantial hinges on it.     7
a domestic private brand k, a foreign brand j, and the public brand. Following the 
literature on mixed oligopoly we assume that there is a single public brand. The 
assumption is not crucial for our results, but it simplifies the algebra. σ >1 is the 
elasticity of substitution between brands (below in equations (7) to (9) it is the 
elasticity of demand facing each producer). The number of domestic private brands 
and foreign brands are given by n and n
* respectively. The price index corresponding 
to X is  
















k q p p P ,                                (4) 
where
f
j k p p , , and q are, respectively, prices of a domestic private brand k, an 
imported brand j, and the public brand. Note that the price of an imported brand, pj
f, is 
inclusive of tariffs, i.e., pj
f = (1+t)pj
*
  where pj
* is the international price of the jth  
foreign brand  and t > 0 is the ad-valorem tariff rate. 
The utility maximization exercise (maximizing (1) subject to (2)) followed by 
aggregation across d K L + consumers yields the expenditure shares of the 
homogenous goods and the differentiated goods as follows:  
z y ) 1 ( α − = ,          ( 5 )  
z PX α = ,          ( 6 )  
where y, X, and z denote, respectively, the aggregate consumption of homogeneous 
good, aggregate quantity index of differentiated good, and national income. Next, 
maximizing the sub-utility function Xi, given by (3), subject to the constraint that the 
sum of expenditure on all brands has to be less than or equal to PXi , yields the 
demands for individual brands by each consumer i. Adding all consumers’ demands 
yields the aggregate demand for these brands as follows:  
z P p x k k α
σ σ 1 − − = ,       ( 7 )  
        z P p t x j j α
σ σ 1 * * ) ) 1 ((
− − + = ,                      (8) 
      z P q s α
σ σ 1 − − = .       ( 9 )  
Hereafter we will focus on a symmetric equilibrium where each private firm 
sets the same price pk = p, and produces the same amount of output xk = x. The same 
is true for foreign varieties, i.e., 
* * x x j = . Following the standard practice in the small 
open economy literature with imperfect competition (see, e.g., Venables, 1982; Sen et   8
al., 1997; Chakraborty 2001), we assume that the price and the number of foreign 
brands are exogenously given.  
 
2.2  Firms 
 
The homogenous good, whose output is denoted by Y, is produced under 
constant returns to scale using labor and capital. Competition, together with the 
constant returns to scale technology, implies the equality between price (unity for the 
numeraire) and marginal cost: 
1 = + r a w a KY LY ,                                        (10) 
where aij denotes the amount of factor i (= L, K) utilized in producing a unit of good j, 





The production of each private brand consists of two components—a variable 
cost and a fixed cost. Both components use a CRS technology (different from the ones 
used in the homogenous goods sector) employing labor and capital. Profit 





− = + p r a w a Kx Lx .                             (11) 
Free entry of private firms in the differentiated goods sector implies that 
private profits are zero in equilibrium. Thus for each private brand, the excess of 
revenue over total variable cost (as reflected in (11)) exactly covers the fixed costs 
incurred. This gives 
σ
px
r a w a KF LF = + ,                                    (12) 
where aiF  denotes the amount of factor i (= L, K) used as fixed input. Though each 
component—variable or fixed—exhibits CRS, the presence of the fixed cost itself 
implies the presence of increasing returns to scale in the differentiated goods sector. 
                                                 
9 When the production function of the differentiated good sector is homogenous of degree one, its cost 
function can be written as c
x(w,r)x, where c
x(w,r) denote the unit cost function of x.  Wong (1995) 
and Feenstra (2003) adopt this formulation. We followed Jones (1965) in using aLiw + aKir instead of 
c
x(w,r). The two approaches are equivalent.    9










= . This assumption used elsewhere in the literature (see e.g., 
Antras 2003, p. 1382) makes the total cost function homothetic. In particular, using 
(11) and (12), this assumption implies that x is constant.  
 
Public sector enterprise (PSE) 
 
While a private firm maximizes profit, a public sector enterprise often has 
non-profit motives. Following Boycko, Shleifer, Vishny (1996) we assume that a PSE 
gets some additional benefit from higher spending on labor. The profit of the PSE is  
    Kf Lf Ks Ls g ra wa s ra wa q − − − − = ) ( π  
where ais is the amount of input i (= L, K) employed to produce one unit of s and  aif  
is the labor employed in fixed component of s. In contrast to private firms that 
maximize profit, the PSE maximizes 
                           ) ( ) 1 ( Lf Ls g a s a w + − + ψ π  
and  ) ( ) 1 ( Lf Ls a s a w + −ψ captures the non-pecuniary benefit to the public firm due to 
higher labor spending. The parameter ψ ∈ (0,1] is a proxy for the degree of 
privatization of PSE. It increases as the extent of privatization increases.  If the PSE is 
completely privatized ψ = 1.
10  
This formulation suggests that a PSE behaves like a profit-maximizing firm 
except it faces a wage rate of wψ instead of w.  The pricing condition corresponding 
to PSE is: 




ψ − = + q r a w a Ks Ls .                     (13)
  
In equilibrium  g π could be negative or positive. That is PSE can make losses or 
profits in our framework. If the PSE makes losses, we assume that it is paid for by 
                                                 
10 The idea that a PSE attached a positive weight to something other than its own profit is borrowed 
from the mixed oligopoly literature. However, the papers in that literature assume that a PSE 
maximizes a weighted average of profit and welfare. As most papers use partial equilibrium 
framework, factor markets are typically not considered in that literature.  Introduction of factor 
markets allow us to consider a scenario where a PSE attach a positive weight on wage bill for its 
employees. Positive weight in turn implies lower capital-labour ratio for PSEs which accord well 
with empirical evidence. See footnote 11.   10
non-distortionary taxes on consumers. Positive profits of the PSE (if any) are 
distributed back to the consumers. 
Two remarks are in order regarding loss-making PSEs. If ψ = 1, so that there 
is no implicit subsidy, the PSE can make losses if qs/σ does not cover the fixed 
cost Kf Lf ra wa + . If ψ < 1, then PSE can make losses even in the absence of fixed 













Ls .  
             As long as Ψ < 1, capital intensity of the public brand will be lower than that 









> . This is in line with the commonplace 
observation that PSEs employ labor-intensive techniques.
11 Also, since the 
differentiated goods sector is presumably producing the importable manufacturing 
goods, we assume that the capital-intensity of the private brands is higher than the 










From the discussion above it follows that private brands use the most capital 
intensive techniques. Whether the capital-labor ratio is higher in the PSE or the 
homogenous goods sector depends on ψ. If ψ is close to one, the public sector firm is 
almost a pure profit-maximizing firm and consequently the factor intensities are 
































> > when ψ is close to one. On the other hand, if ψ is 









<  will hold. We focus on the low values of ψ such that the capital–labor 













< < .  
The factor-intensity rankings play important role in our framework. If the public 
brand is the least capital-intensive one (which is the case for small values of ψ), 
                                                 
11 The higher labor intensity of PSEs is observed in the developing as well as developed countries. 
Testing for labor intensity of state-owned enterprises listed among the 500 largest non-US firms in 
1975, 1985, and 1995, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) find that the private firms use significantly 
less labor-intensive processes than state-owned enterprises.   11
wages decrease and the number of varieties decline with an increase in the degree of 
privatization—see sections 3.1 and 3.2. On the other hand, if the homogenous good 
sector is most labor intensive (which holds for high values of ψ) an increase in the 
degree of privatization can still lower wages, but the number of private brands will 
always increase privatization.  However, the key results of the paper—e.g., a worker’s 
welfare decreases with privatization, an increased capital inflow (along with 
privatization) leads to improvement in a worker’s welfare—can hold under a range of 
parameterizations. 
2.3  Market Clearing Equations 
The market clearing equations for labor and capital, respectively, are given by  
  L a s a n a nx a Y a Lf Ls LF Lx LY = + + + +                                      (14) 
f d Kf Ks KF Kx KY K K a s a n a nx a Y a + = + + + + ,                               (15) 
whereL and  d K are aggregate labor and domestic capital respectively in the economy. 
Given the paucity of domestic capital in small, tariff-ridden, developing economies, 
we assume, quite realistically, that the economy also employs foreign capital ( f K ).
12 
In addition to the factor-market clearing equations, we have conditions (7), (8), and 
(9) which are the market clearing conditions for the private domestic brands, foreign 
brands, and public brands, respectively. Together, equations (7)–(9), (14) and (15) 
imply that trade is balanced,
13 i.e.,  
* * * x p n y Y = − .                  (16) 
The national income for this small open economy, denoted by z, is given by
                     
* * * x p tn K r L w z g d + + + = π .                                (17)        
where the terms in the right-hand side of (17) respectively are wage income, capital 
income, PSE’s profit and the tariff revenue. This completes the specification of the 
model. To obtain sharper results we will often focus on the case where the share of 
PSE’s profit and tariff revenues in national income is small.   
 
                                                 
12 We think of the amount of foreign capital as being exogenously given—it is more like a policy 
parameter. While this can be relaxed (e.g., by making it responsive to r), it is arguably a feature of 
the countries that pursued an inward-looking industrialization policy. 
13 Thus this country produces some brands of the differentiated good but these are non-traded. This we 
believe is also a feature of countries that followed an inward-looking industrialization policy.   12
3  Privatization 
In our framework the public sector maximizes  
) ( ) 1 ( Lf Ls g a s a w + − + ψ π  
where 0 < ψ < 1. A higher value of ψ implies less concern for labor spending. We 
model an increase in the degree of privatization as an increase in ψ and explore its 
impact on product and factor prices, number of varieties, and finally welfare. For ease 
of exposition we will refer to an increase in ψ as privatization (rather than an increase 
in the degree of privatization). 
             To facilitate the analysis, we express the equations as well as the comparative 
statics results in terms of proportionate changes (e.g. x dx x d x / ln ˆ = = ). 
Differentiation of (10), (11), and (12) gives, respectively,  
0 ˆ ˆ = + r w KY LY θ θ ,                    (18)   
p r w Kx Lx ˆ ˆ ˆ = +θ θ ,                      (19) 
and  
               x p r w KF LF ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ + = +θ θ ,                     (20)   
where ij θ  is the share of the factor i in production of output j as a proportion of 
marginal cost.  
Recall that we assumed the capital intensities in the fixed and the variable 
components of the production are identical (i.e., θix = θiF,  i = L, K), which  implies 
0 ˆ = x  (from (19) and (20)). Thus the scale of the private firm’s production does not 
change with privatization, which implies that any change in aggregate production of 
the private brands is determined solely by entry–exit considerations. Solving forw ˆ  
and r ˆ from (18) and (19), in terms of  p ˆ , together with the factor-intensity ranking, 
yields the Stolper-Samuelson effects:  
























.            (21) 
Differentiating the pricing equation (13) of the PSE and then using (21) gives:  
       p q
Lx LY
LY Ls






− = .                                  (22) 
 By lowering implicit subsidy, privatization directly raises the price of the public 
brand (q).  However, there is also an indirect effect of privatization that operates 
through factor prices. The second term on the right-hand side of (22) captures this   13
effect.  In subsection 3.5 we show that the direct effect dominates: privatization leads 
to higher price of the PSE.  
To understand how privatization impacts the PSE’s output first we 
differentiate (7) and (9) which respectively yields: 
z P p x ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ + − + − = σ σ                   (23) 
z P q s ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ + − + − = σ σ                  (24) 




σ ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ Ls
Lx LY
Lx Ls p s −
−
−
=                    (25) 
An increase in ψ directly lowers the PSE’s output. However, as equation (25) suggests 
that’s not the only effect. Later, in subsection 3.5 we analyze these effects in details 
and show that the direct effect dominates. Privatization lowers the PSE’s output.      
Logarithmic differentiation of the factor-market clearing equations, followed 
























































Kf Ks KF Kx KY p s n Y ,     (27)            
          
 
where γij is the physical share of factor i in j ∈ {Y,x,F,s} and εj is the elasticity of 
substitution in production line j.  
Further, differentiation of the price index (equation 4) and national income 
identity (equation 17) gives:  
      q p n P ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
1 ˆ




= ,                 (28) 
                    ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
*
g g t r w x r w z π λ λ λ λ + + + =                     (29) 
where β1, β2 and (1-β1 - β2) are the shares of domestic brands, the public brand, and 
foreign brands, respectively, in total expenditure on the differentiated good (PX), and 
λw, λr, λg, λt respectively denote the shares of (i) wage income (wL), (ii) domestic 
capital income (rK), (iii) PSE’s profit (πg), and (iv) tariff revenue (tn
*p*x
*), in 
national income.  
In Appendix we show that differentiation of the goods-market clearing   14
conditions in (7) – (9) with suitable substitutions from (21) – (23) in the resultant 
expressions yield  
ψ θ β σ β ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ 2 1 Ls n p A − − = − .                 (30) 
where A =  )) 1 ( ( )) 1 ( )( 1 ( 2 1 t
Lx LY















+ − is strictly 
negative. 
 
Observe that we have four equations --- (25), (26), (27) and (30) --- in four 
variables  s n Y ˆ , ˆ , ˆ and  p ˆ . Now we are ready for the comparative statics.  Hereafter, 
throughout the analysis, we focus on environment where the following conditions 
hold: 
 
C1. Elasticity of substitution in all lines of production is low. In particular, we assume  
       εj ≈ 0, where j = Y,s, f and F.  
C2. The additional positive weight on labor spending in the PSE’s objective function,  
       i.e. (1-ψ), is high or equivalently ψ is low (recall, the PSE maximizes   
       ) ( ) 1 ( Lf Ls g a s a w + − + ψ π ). 
 
3.1  Prices 
How does privatization affect the prices in our framework? Proposition 1 
discusses the effect of privatization on price of the private brand and Proposition 2 
examines the effect of privatization on factor prices: wages and returns to capital.  
The details of calculations are in Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1: Privatization---modeled as an increase in ψ---raises the price of 
domestic private brands.  
Proof:  Solving (25) – (27) and (30) in Appendix we find that:   
[ ] )] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ ) 1 (
ˆ
ˆ
1 2 Lf Ls KY Kf Ks LY Lf Lx KY Kf Kx LY Ls
Ls p
γ γ γ γ γ γ σ β γ γ γ γ γ γ θ β σ
θ
ψ
+ − + − + − + −
Δ
− =
          ( 3 1 )  
where   15
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ 1 Lf Ls KY Kf Ks LY
Lx LY
Lx Ls
LF Lx KY KF Kx LY A γ γ γ γ γ γ
θ θ
θ θ
σ β γ γ γ γ γ γ + − +
−
−
+ + − + = Δ
           
In Appendix, we show that A < 0 and ∆ < 0. Since x is least labor-intensive we have 
that (i)  ) ( ) ( Lf Lx KY Kf Kx LY γ γ γ γ γ γ + − +  > 0. Furthermore, for low values of ψ, the 
public brand uses the most labor-intensive technique of production. Thus the 
following holds: (ii)  ) ( ) ( Lf Ls KY Kf Ks LY γ γ γ γ γ γ + − + < 0. The sign of ∆, together 






.          Q E D  
 
  That privatization leads to higher prices also arise in a partial equilibrium 
framework.  As public firms become more profit-oriented they cut back their output 
which in turn leads to higher prices. See, for example, Anderson et al (1997). Since 
the same result hold here, it might seem that general equilibrium concerns or more 
specifically factor-market considerations do not add much. However, note that the 
result remains unaltered only if factor-intensity rankings are right! For example, if the 
differentiated goods sector is labor-intensive compared to the homogenous goods 
sector and the PSE uses the most capital-intensive technique then privatization might 
lead to lower prices. 
 
Proposition 2: Privatization leads to lower wages and higher returns to capital. 
Proof: By Proposition 1, (i) 
ψ ˆ
ˆ p

















) while (i) and (iii) 






).       QED         
An increase in ψ which effectively acts as a reduction in wage subsidy to the 
PSE results in lower demand for labor in the PSE. Overall, this leads to an excess 
supply of labor since for low values of ψ, the PSE uses the most labor-intensive 
technique.  Excess supply of labor in turn leads to lower wages.  Opposite is true for 
returns to capital. 
   16
3.2 Number of varieties 
 
Ours is a small open economy model, and, accordingly, the number of foreign 
brands is exogenously given (see Venables, 1982 and Sen et al., 1997 for a 
rationalization of the assumption). Hence, to determine the effects of privatization on 
the number of varieties available to consumers, it is sufficient to examine the effect of 
privatization on the number of domestic brands produced.  
 
Proposition 3: Privatization reduces the number of domestic varieties. 
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We have already established in Appendix that Δ < 0. Furthermore, the assumed 
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+ − − − − −  < 0.  
Thus 
ψ ˆ
ˆ n  < 0.                                                                                                             QED 
 
There are two effects at work here. As argued previously --- see the discussion 
after Proposition 2 --- an increase in privatization leads to excess supply of labor and 
excess demand for capital. This implies that at given prices the capital-intensive 
sector producing private brands will contract. Thus, at given prices, privatization 
induces exit of private domestic firms. This channel arises due to general equilibrium 
considerations where factors are reallocated even if prices are fixed. However, prices 
are not fixed. Proposition 1 showed that privatization raises the price of the domestic 
private brand which encourages entry into the differentiated goods sector, suggesting 
that the differentiated goods sector would expand following privatization. For low 
elasticities of substitution (in production), the effect operating through the price 
channel is weak, which in turn gives Proposition 3.  
Anderson et al. (1997) show that privatization of a public firm—modeled as a   17
switch from welfare maximization to profit maximization as the objective function—
increases the number of brands in the long run. Privatization raises price which induce 
entry. In contrast, we find that when private and public firms use different 
technologies (as they often do in reality), privatization can lead to the exit of private 
firms from the differentiated goods sector. In addition to increased product prices and 
lower wages, now there is one more source of welfare loss from privatization —fewer 
domestic varieties.
14  
  Note that both conditions C1 and C2 – large weight on labor spending and low 
elasticity of substitution in production --- are crucial for Proposition 3.   If the weight 
on labor spending is very small, the public variety is almost as capital-intensive as the 
domestic private ones. In such cases, a decline in public brand production does not 
necessarily lead to exit of private brands. If the elasticities of substitution are high in 
production, entry induced by higher price of private brand might lead to a higher 
number of domestic varieties following privatization. 
 
3.3  Trade and tariff revenues 
  Does privatization promote trade or hinder trade? According to our 
framework, privatization raises the price of domestic brands which makes foreign 
brands more attractive vis-à-vis the domestic brands and consequently imports 
increase following privatization. Thus privatization and trade flows are 
complementary in our framework. Since tariff rate is exogenously set in our model, 
tariff revenues also increase following privatization. 
 
Proposition 4: Privatization leads to higher imports and consequently higher tariff 
revenues. 
Proof: Substituting  0 ˆ = x in (23) and rearranging gives the following equality: 
z P p ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ + − = σ σ .  Differentiating (8) gives and using the equality we get  
z P x ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ
* + − = σ ,                                     
                                                 
14 A reduction in the number of brands from the free entry level can improve welfare by economizing 
on entry costs and lowering the average cost (if there are economies of scale). In a homogenous 
product oligopoly, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) have shown that 
entry regulation can indeed improve welfare. However, under Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (capturing 
love for variety) a reduction in the number of brands lowers welfare.    18












Since t is fixed, tx




In a recent work on mixed oligopolies, Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009) 
showed that privatization encourages foreign direct investment. Our work offers a 
complementary message.  Privatization leads to an increase in trade flows. In 
particular, more foreign brands are imported as the domestic brands become more 
expensive with privatization.  
 
3.4 Public sector enterprise 
 





Ls ˆ ˆ ) ( ˆ ˆ σ
θ θ
θ θ
σ ψ σθ +
−
−
+ − =  
Privatization, acting as a reduction in implicit wage subsidy, increases marginal cost 
and reduces PSE’s output. The first term on the right-hand side,  ψ σθ ˆ Ls − , captures 
this direct effect.  In our general equilibrium framework there is an additional effect 
on the cost side: privatization lower wages and raises return to capital (Proposition 2). 
As long as PSE’s production is the most labor-intensive one, this effect partially 
offsets the higher cost (due to lower implicit wage subsidy).   The second term on the 
right-hand side,  p
Lx LY






, captures this positive effect.  Finally, the third term, 
p ˆ σ , captures the increased demand for the PSE’s brand (at a given q) as the private 
brands become more expensive following privatization. We find that the direct effect 
(i.e., the first one) dominates leading to contraction of the PSE. 
 
Proposition 5: Privatization lowers output and raises price of the public brand.  
Proof: Substituting the expression for 
ψ ˆ
ˆ p
from the proof of Proposition 1 in (25) and 
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s .  
  Using (23), (25) and  0 ˆ = x we get: 
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p .    QED   
  Proposition 5 confirms what one expects: privatization cuts back the PSE’s 
output and raises the price of the public brand. However, as we show above, there are 
subtle general equilibrium mechanisms at work which operate through factor markets. 
   
  Finally, we turn to the PSE’s profit. According to its proponents, a significant 
benefit of privatization is that it cuts down public sector losses. Anderson et. al (1997) 
showed that in the long run with free entry of firms privatization improves welfare 
only if the public firm makes losses. As the PSEs are not required to make non-
negative profits, it is often assumed that losses made by the PSE are covered by 
lumpsum taxes on consumers.  On the other hand, several authors impose a non-
negativity constraint on PSE’s profit arguing that taxes are distortionary and probably 
more so in developing countries (see, for example, Saha and Sensarma, 2004). 
Whether PSE makes profit or not is not crucial for our results. Following 
privatization, the PSE’s operating profit increases as q increases and s declines.  
 
3.5 Closed Economy versus Open Economy
15 
Note that while we conduct our analysis in an open economy setup, most of 
our results hold in the closed economy set up as well. For example, the effect of 
privatization on (i) the prices of the domestic private brands (Proposition 1), (ii) factor 
prices (Proposition 2) and (iii) the number of domestic varieties (Proposition 3) does 
not rely on open economy features of the model.  In that sense closed economy setup 
                                                 
15 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us to comment on this issue.   20
in our context is a special case of open economy set up, where the share of imports in 
domestic consumption bundle and the share of tariff revenues in national income is 
zero. Despite this, we focus on an open economy model since some of the issues 
considered in conjunction with privatization in the policy circles, e.g., trade 
liberalization, capital inflows, requires open economy setting. We examine the 
possible complementarities between these policies in section 5.  
 
4  Political Support for Privatization 
Support for any reform comes from those who stand to gain from the reforms. 
Our analysis suggests that the capitalists—both domestic and foreign—benefit from 
higher returns to capital following privatization (see Proposition 2). Thus capitalists 
are likely to support privatization unless the loss from the reduction in the number of 
varieties is large.  
Since imports increase with privatization, foreign firms will support privatization 
as well. In addition, the revenue-constrained governments—a feature that we abstract 
from but which is often the case in developing countries—are likely to be supportive 
of privatization as it raises tariff revenues.
16 If foreign firms are influential in 
domestic policies or if the political scenario is such that governments can ignore the 
wishes of the majority (i.e., workers in this case), then, once again, privatization can 
be successfully implemented.   
However, in several countries undertaking or willing to undertake privatization, 
workers, due to their sheer numbers, play an important role. This suggests that at least 
in democracies with a significant involvement of PSEs (e.g., India, Turkey), a 
precondition for privatization to be politically viable is that the workers are not worse 
off.
17   
 
Remarks: Although we focus on the welfare effects of privatization on workers, 
                                                 
16 There is a direct increase in government revenues from the sale of PSEs, which we do not focus on 
here. Our analysis shows that there is also an indirect channel through which the government’s 
revenues could increase—through increased imports subject to tariffs.   
17  Although we focus on the welfare of workers alone, the fact that these workers are considered 
identical places our model somewhere between a political economy model (with differential 
endowments among individuals) and the canonical welfare maximizing social planner who puts 
equal weights on utilities of all individuals. See Dutt and Mitra (2002) for a simple political economy 
model in an open economy context. Baland and Francois (2005) look at privatization in the presence 
of a commons and find that privatization may increase efficiency but reduce welfare.   21
except when we consider factor returns, the interests of capitalists and workers are 
aligned. For example, both capitalists and workers are adversely affected by an 
increase in domestic brand prices and a possible decline in the number of varieties 
consumed. Indeed, if the workers are better off with privatization, capitalists are also 
better off, although the reverse is not true.  
Second, one might ask why improvement in workers’ welfare is considered in 
isolation. After all, if privatization improves welfare, then surely some transfers can 
be arranged so that the workers are as well off as without privatization. This point 
requires clarification. Note that since returns to capital increases with privatization, 
national income can increase with privatization, if the share of rental income in 
national income is large. However, an increase in national income does not 
necessarily translate to increase in welfare as price index increases with privatization 
as well. Even if the welfare gains from an increase in national income outweighs the 
welfare loss from a reduction in the number of varieties, it is not clear whether 
redistribution/transfers can be implemented. In fact, it is precisely because those 
transfers are highly costly and distortionary that the governments in these countries 
resort to direct production of manufacturing output in the first place.  
Third, the standard political economy models assume that each individual is 
endowed with one unit of labor and differential amounts of capital. Political support 
depends on whether the median voter’s welfare improves with privatization. Here we 
assume that workers are identical and have no capital. While it might seem extreme, 
the assumption is not far from reality in the developing economies—the median 
individual in these countries has little or no capital.   
Now we turn to the effect of privatization on workers’ welfare. Let Vw denote 
the indirect utility of the representative worker. For simplicity, we assume now that 
the tariff revenues are returned to the workers while taxes (if any) are paid by the 
capitalists.  
 
Proposition 6: If the share of tariff revenue in workers’ income is low, privatization 
reduces workers’ welfare.   
Proof: The utility maximization exercise in (1), together with the fact that the 
workers’ income consists of wages and tariff revenues, gives  
α α α α α
− − + − = P
L
x p tn
w Vw ) ( ) 1 (
* * *
1 .   22
Differentiating logarithmically and rearranging yields 
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+ − − − + = ,                       (33)  
where μ denotes the share of wages in a worker’s income. 












. Proposition 2 says 






. In addition, from Proposition 3 we know 






). From (33) it follows 




> 0. Privatization benefits workers only 




<0). If the share 
of tariff revenue in workers’ income (i.e., 1-μ) is small, then the conclusion obtained 




> 0.                         QED 
Though the wages are lower and the prices (of domestic brands) are higher 
with privatization, the number of varieties might be more or less depending on the 
elasticities of substitution in production—see the discussion in section 3.2. The low 
elasticities (e.g., Leontief technology) ensure that the number of varieties decline with 
privatization, which adds to the welfare loss arising from lower wages and higher 
prices. Even if the elasticity of substitutions are large and consequently the number of 
varieties increases following privatization, the workers’ welfare will still generally be 
lower with privatization due to lower wages and higher prices. However, for low 
values of σ (the elasticity of substitution between the various brands), which implies a 
very strong love for variety, it is possible that the welfare gains from the increased 
number of varieties outweigh the welfare losses from the other sources. 
 
Remark: Following the literature on small open economy models of monopolistic 
competition, we have assumed that the number of imported varieties is exogenously 
given. With an endogenous number of foreign varieties, privatization can lead to an 
increase in the number of foreign brands since domestic brands become more   23
expensive with privatization. This suggests a reduction in the overall number of 
varieties and consequently the welfare loss is less when the number of imported 
varieties is endogenously determined. Although this partially offsets the negative 
impact of privatization, it is unlikely to outweigh the welfare loss arising from a 
reduction in wages. 
 
5  Complementary Reforms 
Since the capitalists and the foreign firms gain from privatization, 
complementary reforms are not necessary in order to implement privatization if these 
groups are influential in the policy making. However, if workers’ welfare is the 
central concern, then privatization alone will not be politically viable. Does that mean 
privatization, as a goal, is unattainable in democratic developing economies? The 
answer is no according to the analysis in this section. Although privatization, pursued 
alone, can reduce workers’ welfare, there are complementary policies which, if 
undertaken along with privatization, can offset the welfare loss. Given that ours is a 
tariff-ridden open economy, we consider two policy interventions, which are absent in 
a closed economy model—namely, an increase in foreign investment and a reduction 
in the tariff rate.  
 
5.1  Foreign Investment 
Recall from section 4 that the workers are better off with privatization if and 
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                                          (34) 
Amending (27) to incorporate proportional changes in foreign capital and then 
solving (25) - (27) and (30) gives (see Appendix)    
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where f denotes the foreign share in the total capital employed in the economy, ∆ < 0 






















denote, respectively, the effect of  
privatization on the number of varieties and the price, in the absence of other policy 
interventions—these are given by (32) and (31) in section 3.  
 
Substituting (35a) and (35b) in (34) and defining  
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< 0. Assume that μ is large. That is, the share of wages in a worker’s overall 
















αβ σ μ αβ
θ θ
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2 1 ) 1 ( is strictly positive. Then from (35a) and 
(35b) respectively it follows that if foreign investment is increased along with 
privatization, the number of domestic varieties increases and prices decline, both of 
which reduce the welfare losses that arise when privatization alone is implemented. 
Indeed, given A and ∆ are negative, (36) implies that an increase in foreign investment   25






) for an improvement in workers’ welfare. 




) required to neutralize the welfare 








Proposition 7: Privatization, combined with suitable increases in foreign investment, 
increases workers’ welfare.  
Proof: Follows from the discussion above.                                                             QED 
 
To understand Proposition 7, note that an increase in foreign investment has 
two welfare-improving effects. First, it leads to an increase in the number of domestic 
private brands—the capital-intensive sector in our framework. Second, an increased 
supply of foreign capital leads to higher wages. Since wages and brand prices are 
negatively related—via the Stolper-Samuelson effect—prices are also lower. Both 
these effects raise welfare.  
It might seem that an increase in foreign capital is unambiguously welfare 
improving, with or without privatization. However, that is not necessarily the case. In 
a small open economy with perfect competition, several authors (including Johnson, 
1967 and Bhagwati, 1968) have shown that an inflow of foreign capital could 
immiserize the recipient economy in the presence of tariffs in a large number of 
scenarios. Indeed, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) showed that an inflow of 
foreign capital is necessarily immiserizing, if the import-competing sector is capital 
intensive and foreign capital income is repatriated in full.
18 The import-competing 
differentiated goods sector is indeed capital intensive (ignoring the public firm) in our 
framework and focusing on workers’ welfare alone makes our model akin to a set up 
where the capital income accrues entirely to foreigners. However, in the presence of 
imperfect competition in the import-competing sector—which is true for our 
framework—the immiserization is unlikely to hold.  
 
                                                 
18 Grinols (1991) provides an example in a Harris-Todaro framework where immiserization does not 
occur.    26
5.2  Trade Liberalization 
Now consider combining trade liberalization with privatization. Note that in a 
model such as ours, trade liberalization by itself is welfare reducing since it causes an 
exit from the domestic differentiated goods sector (see, e.g., Venables, 1982). 
Incorporating trade liberalization (i.e., a reduction in tariff rate t) in the presence of 
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where t > 0 , T = 1 + t , and  
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= .                 (38b) 
In Appendix, we derive the expression for C and show that (i) C > 0. We have 
already shown that (ii) Δ < 0. The assumed factor intensity rankings imply that (iii) 
Lx LY θ θ − > 0, (iv)  Lx Ls θ θ − < 0, (v)   ) ( ) ( LF Lx KY KF Kx LY γ γ γ γ γ γ + − + > 0, (vi) 
) ( ) ( Lf Ls KY Kf Ks LY γ γ γ γ γ γ + − + < 0.  Together, (i) – (vi) imply that  

































of domestic varieties will decline even further while the price of the domestic private 
brands will decline. That trade liberalization leads to fewer domestic private brands 
might be surprising. However, note that the small open economy exports homogenous 
goods in our framework. With trade liberalization, the exportable sector producing the 
homogenous good expands whereas the import-competing sector producing 
differentiated brands contracts, and accordingly the number of domestic private 
brands decline. The reduction in the number of private brands, n, raises the price 
index and lowers welfare.   27
 
How does privatization impact total welfare when it is pursued along with 
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       (39)    
The second term on the right-hand side of (39) captures the direct beneficial 
effect of a reduction in tariff rates. A reduction in tariff rates directly benefits the 
consumers by lowering the price index. However, tariff reductions also lower tariff 
revenues. The former beneficial effect (i.e., lower prices) dominates the latter as long 
as  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 μ β β α − − − − (1+1/t) > 0—which holds if the share of rebated tariff 
revenue in a worker’s overall income is small (i.e., μ is large). We had assumed this 
to be the case. 
The third term on the RHS of (39) captures an additional benefit from trade 
liberalization  which works through lower prices. Note that the lower prices of private 
brands not only benefit consumers directly, but also through an increase in wages. 
To summarize, though there are gains from trade liberalization due to higher 
wages and lower prices of foreign and domestic private brands, the number of 
varieties is reduced with trade liberalization. The magnitude of the adverse welfare 
effect of trade liberalization is small if brands are close substitutes (σ large). This 
implies the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 8: Privatization combined with trade liberalization increases workers’ 
welfare provided the brands are not too differentiated (i.e., σ is not close to unity). 
Proof: Follows from the discussion above.                                                           QED 
 
These two propositions, i.e., Propositions 7 and 8, suggest an otherwise 
unpopular privatization might be politically viable if governments can undertake   28
reforms in other arenas as well—in our case, trade and capital accounts.  
6  Conclusion 
Prompted by poor performance and widespread inefficiencies, governments in 
several developing countries have attempted to withdraw from the manufacturing 
sector, in which it used to have a significant share both in terms of output and 
employment.  What are the welfare consequences of such a retreat? We attempted to 
address this question by embedding public sector production—characterized by labor-
intensive techniques and a lack of market discipline (these firms continue to produce 
even if profits are negative)—in a general equilibrium model with imperfect 
competition. Although there is a small body of work incorporating the government 
provision of public goods in the trade literature, direct government production does 
not seem to have received much attention.   
Our findings suggest that privatization may have several benefits. It reduces 
losses of the PSEs, raises the returns to capital, and increases the tariff revenue—all of 
which improve welfare. However, due to the use of labor-intensive techniques, a 
shrinking of the public sector might create unemployment or in a full-employment 
model like ours, lower wages. More surprisingly, we find that if elasticities of 
substitution are low in production, private brands producers, rather than filling up the 
void created through the contraction of the public sector, might actually exit. Fewer 
brands together with lower wages reduce the welfare of workers. This suggests that 
pursuing privatization alone might be politically costly.      
According to our model, to do it right—i.e., to privatize without immiserizing 
the workers—requires complementary reforms. In particular, the government needs to 
provide suitable incentives and an environment to attract foreign investment into the 
country. This stands in sharp contrast to findings from perfectly competitive trade 
models where capital inflow in a tariff-distorted economy, with a capital-intensive 
importable sector, reduces welfare. Trade liberalization (also welfare-reducing by 
itself in presence of imperfect competition), if pursued along with privatization 
improves workers’ welfare only if there is not much differentiation—which is true if 
the sector produces relatively basic manufacturing goods.   
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Appendix  
1. Derivation of (30)    
Differentiating (7), (8), and (9) respectively yield:  
z P p ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ 0 + − + − = σ σ ,                            (A1) 
z P x ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ
* + − = σ ,                                    (A2) 
z P q s ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ + − + − = σ σ .                  (A3) 
Subtracting (A1) from (A3) gives  
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and subtracting (A1) from (A2) yields 
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Adding these equations and using   
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Equation (28) in the text follows once we define  
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2. Sign of A  
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Similarly using  t r w λ λ λ − ≈ + 1( s i n c e 0 ≈ g λ ) it can be shown that  
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   (A9) 
From (A8) and (A9) it follows that A, as defined in (A7), is negative.     
   
3. Derivations of (31) and (32) 
Substituting (25) in (26) and (27) and assuming εj ≈ 0, equations (26), (27) and (30) 
can be written in the matrix form as follows: 
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where A is as defined in A7. Equations (31) and (32) then follow immediately from 
applying Cramer’s rule. 
 
4. Derivations of (35a) and (35b) 







= . Amending (27) to incorporate proportional changes in foreign 
investment (denoted by f K ˆ ), the three equations—(26), (27), and (30)—can be put in 
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Applying Cramer’s rule and simplifying subsequently we get (35a) and (35b).  
 
5.  Derivations of (38a) and (38b) 
Note that T = (1+t) where t > 0 is the ad-valorem tariff rate on imports. Let T ˆ  denote 
the proportionate change in T (i.e., T ˆ  = d ln T). Incorporating T ˆ , equations (28), (29), 
and (A2) respectively will be modified as  
             T q p n P ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
ˆ
2 1 2 1
1 β β β β
σ
β
− − + + +
−
= ,            (A10) 
                                g g t r w x t r w z π λ λ λ λ ˆ ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
* + + + + = ,                        (A11) 
and  
     z P T x ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ
* + − + − = σ σ .                (A12) 
Subtracting (A1) from (A12) yields 
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ
* T p x − =σ .                         (A13) 
Substituting (A10), (A11), and (A13) into (A1) and rearranging gives: 
= + − T C n p A ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 β ψ θ β σ ˆ ) 1 ( 2 Ls − −                           (A14) 
where A is as in (A7) while  ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 1 t
t
t
C λ β β σ
λ
− − − − + = . Since  t λ β β − − − 2 1 1>  
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Then applying Cramer’s rule equations (38a) and (38b) follow. 
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